Randy Watt on Security, Risk Analysis, and the Lessons from the Charlie Kirk Incident

 Introduction: Why this conversation matters

In an era of heightened political polarization, public events—especially those that court controversy—carry a complex mix of symbolic, legal, and practical risks. Randy Watt brings a rare combination of credentials to that discussion: a long-standing career in municipal policing (36 years with the Ogden Police Department, including time as chief), multiple deployments as a Green Beret with the 19th Special Forces Group, advanced education in strategic studies, and hands-on experience designing and training security teams for major events such as the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. That combination informs a perspective that treats security as both a science and an exercise in values.

Watt’s central premise is simple but essential: good security begins with honest risk analysis and finishes with layered, integrated protections that make hostile actions harder to accomplish while preserving the rights and freedoms that define civic life. The Charlie Kirk incident—where an armed attacker fired shots toward a campus venue—becomes a case study in what can fail and how to prepare differently next time.

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Outline of the article

• Randy Watt’s background: policing, Special Forces, and security consulting
• Security fundamentals: strategic targeting, red cell exercises, and the three rings of protection
• Applying risk analysis to public events: why the Charlie Kirk appearance qualified as high-risk
• Personal protection details, local law enforcement, and the limits of presence-only security
• Specific failure points revealed by rooftop and long-range attacks; historic parallels
• Institutional improvements: templates, DPS leadership, and the school security model
• Threat detection: social media, behavioral indicators, and early-warning systems
• Terrorism as a tactic, the chilling effect on public speech, and the imperative to protect debate
• Practical checklist and recommendations for event hosts, police agencies, and campus security teams
• Concluding reflections on free speech, measured force, and the responsibilities of a free society

Part I — Randy Watt’s professional foundation: why his voice matters

Watt’s career sits at the intersection of two worlds that share an uneasy relationship: municipal policing and special operations. He spent decades with the Ogden Police Department—rising through SWAT and command ranks—and simultaneously served in the Army National Guard as a Green Beret for the 19th Special Forces Group. That dual experience shaped his approach to both operational planning and strategic thinking.

From the earliest years of his police career, Watt was asked to modernize tactical capabilities. In the 1990s, he led efforts to transform SWAT operations to include protection of high-profile prisoners, executive protection for threatened chiefs, and the movement of sensitive detainees. At the same time, his Special Forces background involved counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and strategic targeting: the practice of identifying high-value individuals or nodes in an adversary system and assessing how to neutralize those threats.

These roles brought Watt into contact with the Secret Service, the FBI, and private firms staffed by former special operations members. As a result, he learned two complementary skill sets: how to harden facilities and events through physical, personnel, and technological measures; and how to adopt an adversary’s mindset—via red cell exercises—to discover vulnerabilities before an attacker can exploit them. He later translated these capacities into private practice, founding SRW Incorporated to perform security assessments for personalities and corporations, and he accepted a role as a subject matter expert on school security for a statewide task force.

Takeaway

When Watt speaks about the Charlie Kirk shooting or school safety, he speaks from a foundation that blends tactical proficiency with strategic assessment. That combination is crucial: protection is not just about manpower or technology; it is a planning process that anticipates how an adversary thinks and acts.

Part II — The three rings of security: personnel, physical barriers, and technology

Watt distills the mechanics of event security into an elegant model: three overlapping “rings” or layers of protection. Each ring addresses a different class of risk and, when combined, they produce varying security postures.

1. Personnel & Procedures — This ring covers the human element: bodyguards, security officers, police presence, communications protocols, liaison relationships, and rehearsed procedures for evacuation, lockdown, or medical response. It includes the training that lets people perform under stress, the command-and-control structures that coordinate action, and the human intelligence that identifies concerning behavior.
2. Physical Barriers & Controls — Concrete, fences, controlled entry points, channeling devices (how people are funneled through space), and ballistic mitigation measures (such as bullet-resistant film on ground-level windows). This layer defines who can get where and how hard it is for someone to gain an advantageous position—such as holding “the high ground” on nearby rooftops.
3. Technology — Surveillance cameras, alarms, access control systems, mass-notification systems, audio systems for crowd instructions, and apps or platforms that allow rapid reporting. Technology amplifies human effort and gives early warning for actionable events.

Watt explains a simple but profound logic: if all three rings overlap, that zone is “high security.” If two overlap, it’s “medium.” If you rely on only one—such as merely having some officers visible—the security level is low. The implication is straightforward: layered systems make violent acts harder to carry out and easier to interrupt.

Why presence alone is not security

One of Watt’s blunt observations is that many institutions—especially smaller departments—think security equals a visible police presence. That is a common misconception. Presence is part of deterrence, but it does not address all the vectors an attacker will explore. A single-minded focus on presence can leave gaps that are easy to exploit: unassessed sightlines, unprotected high ground, unattended access points, or communication breakdowns between event security and local law enforcement. Those are the failures Watt identifies in the Charlie Kirk case.

Takeaway

Event planners must intentionally design overlapping protections. Presence helps. Procedures help. Physical controls and technology complete the posture. Missing any ring increases risk, and the Charlie Kirk incident demonstrates how a missing ring can result in tragedy.

Part III — Applying risk analysis to the Charlie Kirk appearance

Watt classifies the Kirk appearance as a “level one security” event. That classification arises from several factors that, when combined, raise the risk profile:

• Volume of threats and hostile communications directed at the speaker in advance;
• Highly charged political context locally and nationally, including the speaker’s connection to polarizing figures;
• Intense social media traffic and public calls to protest or otherwise disrupt;
• Historic precedents of politically motivated attacks at public events, and even recent assassination attempts against public figures.

In Watt’s view, this constellation of risk should have triggered a more thorough, multi-day preparation cycle: site surveys, coordination with the speaker’s close protection team, a plan for controlling sightlines (including topping buildings near the venue), deployment of mass-casualty equipment and medical response teams, and an early-warning monitoring plan—especially focused on social media channels where threats commonly appear.

Watt also points out that the personal protection detail that accompanied Kirk had trained and experienced members. One of the detail members, Watt confirms, is a longtime tactical operator from Texas and a personal friend. Even so, a close protection team operating without deep integration with local authorities and a fully mitigated site plan is limited in scope. Close protection protects the principal at short distances. It is not an all-encompassing force-protection solution for a venue; coordination and perimeter control by local agencies are still vital.

Levels of risk for personal security

Watt breaks down the possible attack vectors and how protection teams need to consider them:

• Close assaults (physical, close-range attacks): demands tight concentric protection, with close team members physically near the principal and rapid access for medical aid.
• Near-assaults (intermediate range, such as thrown devices or shots from nearby streets): requires perimeter control and decisive streaks of observation plus rapid interdiction plans.
• Distant assaults (long-range firearms from rooftops or hills): requires controlling high ground, creating standoff distances, ballistic consideration for venue construction, and overwatch positions with trained marksmen or other response units.

To Watt, the lesson is that a security plan must map threats to ranges and capabilities. An attacker has choices; the defender must anticipate and deny the easy choices.

Part IV — The rooftop problem: probability, ballistics, and old rules of protection

Historically, security doctrine has always emphasized “holding the high ground.” Watt stresses that roofs, hills, and other elevated vantage points present a unique challenge because a firearm is fundamentally a force-delivery mechanism that projects a dangerous payload (a projectile) to a target over a distance. A 200-yard shot—well within the capability of many shooters—is not an exotic feat for seasoned hunters or those who have trained with rifles. That reality means venues need to consider sightlines, possible firing positions, and any structures that allow an attacker to observe and act from those positions.

Watt points to the recurring pattern in several high-profile incidents—most notably, both the Kirk shooting and a separate attack near a presidential event in Pennsylvania—where attackers exploited elevated positions or nearby buildings to take shots. In the Pennsylvania case, Secret Service failures were publicly criticized and personnel were sanctioned for not adequately addressing the high ground. The same failure pattern appears in simpler incidents: a person reaches an elevated location within range and is able to launch a projectile with little immediate resistance.

The remedy is neither purely technical nor purely procedural. It requires:

• Proactive site surveys identifying potential observation and firing positions within effective ranges;
• Control measures to deny access to those positions during critical windows (temporary rooftop security, controlled rooftop access, or contract checks for neighboring properties);
• Physical engineering where possible (creating barriers or obstructions to channel lines of fire);
• Enhanced surveillance to detect suspicious preparations; and
• Rapid decision-making authority and rehearsed response plans for teams tasked with neutralizing discovered threats.

Takeaway

Rooftops will always be attractive to attackers; denying them advantage requires foresight and resources. Institutions must budget for these “old rules” of protection because they remain relevant in a modern threat environment.

Part V — What can institutions learn from the school security model?

Watt draws heavily from his work on a statewide school security task force. Over the past several years, that work has produced tangible requirements and templates that can—and should—be adapted for public events and campus speakers. The core pieces include:

• Threat assessments and site security surveys as standard operating procedures. These are not optional exercises; they are required in many districts and provide a structured way to identify vulnerabilities.
• Secure vestibules and controlled entry points that channel attendees and limit unauthorized access. Proper channelization changes how an attacker can approach and reduces exposed entry points.
• Ballistic mitigation such as door and window film for ground-level glazing. While not bulletproof in every circumstance, these measures slow entry and provide critical seconds to react.
• Surveillance systems integrated with central monitoring and alarms that enable quick identification and targeted instructions to different parts of a building during an incident.
• Mass-casualty equipment and training. Many fatalities in active-shooter events result from preventable hemorrhage. Placement of trauma kits and training teachers/staff in rapid bleeding control saves lives.
• Early-warning processes for identifying individuals at risk—liaison between schools and law enforcement, mental-health assessments, and reporting mechanisms that students and staff can trust.

Watt emphasizes that such measures are not merely reactive. They are preventive. The goal is to increase friction and detection so that either an attack is deterred, interrupted before completion, or its effects mitigated quickly enough to save lives.

Implementing school-type security measures for public events

Many of the same principles apply to college campuses and public auditoriums hosting controversial speakers. A few concrete steps include:

• Mandate site assessments for events with elevated risk; implement checklists derived from school templates.
• Develop roles and responsibilities documents that clearly spell out which tasks belong to the event organizer, the speaker’s close protection team, the campus police department, and municipal law enforcement.
• Adopt a rehearsal schedule for critical procedures: evacuation, lockdown, medical triage, and communications to attendees.
• Ensure mass-notification systems can address segments of the venue independently (north wing lockdown vs. south wing evacuation).

Part VI — Threat detection: social media, behavioral indicators, and success stories

One of the most actionable portions of Watt’s analysis concerns human behavior and the urgency of listening when people communicate intent. Research from the Secret Service and Department of Justice—updated regularly—shows commonalities in the behavior of mass attackers. Notably:

• In roughly 80% of mass-killing cases, the perpetrator told someone within the week before the attack that they intended violence.
• For school shooters specifically, this disclosure often happens within three days of the attack and is frequently shared with a peer or confidant.

Watt cites a recent success in Queens, New York. A 15-year-old posted on social media that he intended to attack his school. Whether discovered via FBI keyword monitoring or a citizen tip, the sequence of response was rapid and decisive: the FBI notified local police within 45 minutes, and within a dozen minutes the local officers were inside the school and in the classroom. A loaded pistol in the suspect’s backpack illustrated how close the situation had been to becoming deadly. The case demonstrates two critical points:

1. Social media is a real-time intelligence source that must be monitored and acted upon.
2. Fast interagency coordination—made possible by rehearsed communication channels—can stop an attack in time.

Watt also mentions tools being developed for reporting: apps that allow students to flag concerning posts or tips anonymously. The combination of technology and trained human reviewers—plus a culture that takes reports seriously—produces results.

Overcoming distrust in authorities

Watt acknowledges a broader cultural problem: widespread distrust of federal and local agencies. Conspiracy theories and rapid rumor circulation on social platforms make effective threat management harder. People sometimes assume authorities will not or cannot act, and that diminishes the likelihood of useful reporting. To counter that, Watt recommends transparency when possible, clear lines of responsibility, and rapid facts-based communications to counter speculation after an incident.

Part VII — Terrorism as tactic, not ideology: the chilling effect on speech

A key conceptual point in Watt’s remarks reframes how society should interpret acts that target public political events. He argues that terrorism is not intrinsically tied to one ideology; rather, terrorism is a tactic—a method of using force or fear to achieve a political goal. Historically, that tactic has been deployed by various groups across the ideological spectrum: leftist actors, nationalist paramilitaries, religious extremists, and more.

The practical consequence of that observation is chilling. If public attacks succeed in producing widespread fear—if significant numbers of citizens decide they are less likely to attend political events—then the aim of the tactic has been realized. Watt cites a KSL poll indicating that half of respondents would be less likely to attend political events following high-profile attacks. That result aligns with the historical playbook of groups aiming to demonstrate that the government cannot protect free assembly, thereby undermining civic processes and discourse.

Watt stresses a normative point: preserving debate and public speaking is an essential civic value. Curtailing assemblies because of fear hands a strategic victory to those seeking to close public forums through intimidation. Effective security, therefore, is not merely a policing function; it is a defense of the democratic process itself.

Speech is not violence

“Words cannot be violent. Therefore, violence delivered as a result of words or hate speech is an act of evil violence, and all forms of speech are protected under the Constitution.”

Watt’s position on free speech is clear. He believes the expression of controversial ideas—even those that inspire anger—remains a fundamental right the state must protect. Security design should therefore focus on enabling speech safely: creating conditions where ideas can be exchanged without fear of harm.

Part VIII — Recommendations: practical steps for organizers, campuses, and police

Watt offers a set of practical, operationally grounded recommendations that, if implemented, would materially reduce the risk of an event turning deadly. These recommendations bridge planning, equipment, training, and culture.

For event organizers and institutions

• Conduct a formal threat assessment at least 72 hours before any high-profile appearance. Document threats, source credibility, and indicators of mobilization.
• Mandate a site security survey. Map potential observation points, elevated positions, and neighboring structures. Identify at least one high-risk blind spot and a mitigation plan for it.
• Assign roles and responsibilities. Produce a simple Responsibility Assignment Matrix that clarifies which tasks belong to the organizer, the principal’s protection detail, campus police, and municipal agencies.
• Channel entry points and manage crowds. Use physical barriers to control flow and create vetted ingress paths. Secure neighboring rooftop access for the event window.
• Ensure medical and mass-casualty readiness. Place trauma kits and trained personnel in strategic locations. Rehearse casualty evacuation routes and designate staging areas for EMS.
• Establish communication protocols. Use designated radio channels, redundant comms, and a central incident commander with decision authority.

For local law enforcement and campus police

• Move beyond presence-based strategies. Invest in training for threat assessments, site surveys, and integrated incident command for non-routine events.
• Develop and share templates. State-level public safety offices (e.g., DPS) should provide checklists for small and medium agencies, university police, and volunteer security teams to standardize planning.
• Coordinate with federal resources. Tap FBI, Secret Service, and fusion center resources early—especially when threats cross jurisdictions or involve national figures.
• Integrate social media monitoring. Establish keyword/search procedures to detect threats in the pre-incident window. Pair that with a tip line mechanism and an app-based reporting tool for students and attendees.
• Rehearse multi-agency responses. Interoperability exercises that simulate rooftop threats, active-shooter scenarios, and mass-casualty triage increase the odds of a controlled outcome.

For security professionals and personal protection details

• Clarify scope and interface with local authorities. The principal’s close protection detail must have a written coordination plan with event security and local law enforcement specifying responsibilities, standoff distances, and emergency extraction routes.
• Conduct combined briefings and rehearsals. Meet with local units at least 72 hours before the event and conduct tabletop exercises for worst-case threats.
• Plan for layered extraction options. Short-notice movement through crowds, alternate exit routes, and prepositioned safe vehicles reduce exposure time if an incident unfolds.

Checklist: the 72-hour preparation plan

1. 72 hours: Conduct comprehensive threat assessment and coordinate with federal partners if threats are national in scope.
2. 48 hours: Complete site survey; secure high-ground control measures and notify property owners of temporary access limitations.
3. 36 hours: Finalize communications plan and mass-notification capabilities; place medical kits and confirm EMS staging.
4. 24 hours: Conduct joint briefing with event organizers, protection detail, campus police, and municipal units; assign incident commander.
5. 12 hours: Rehearse evacuation and lockdown procedures; confirm access controls; confirm surveillance coverage.
6. Event Day: Maintain continual threat monitoring via social media and human intelligence; enforce controlled ingress and egress; retain rapid response unit on call/onsite.

Part IX — Institutional barriers and the role of trust

Watt does not gloss over the institutional and societal limitations that complicate security work. He acknowledges several complicating factors:

• Resource inequality: Not every university or municipality possesses the funding or personnel to execute Gold-standard protection plans. That gap calls for state-level templates that provide scalable options.
• Interagency distrust and cultural friction: Different organizations have different priorities and sometimes mistrust each other. Establishing preexisting trust—through joint training and shared standards—reduces friction during a crisis.
• Public skepticism and political polarization: The more polarized the environment, the more likely that rumors and misinformation will spread post-incident. Clear, timely, factual communications mitigate dangerous speculation.

To address those problems, Watt urges the development of common frameworks that smaller agencies can adopt without inventing processes from scratch. He praises the Department of Public Safety personnel who support local security efforts as model partners, and suggests that a centralized offering of templates, training modules, and quick-reference guides would raise the baseline of performance statewide.

Takeaway

Security is a public-good problem. Where resource limitations exist, centralized templates and shared training reduce variability and improve outcomes. Trust-building among agencies is a strategic investment that pays off when rapid decisions matter.

Part X — Final reflections: free speech, violence, and the ethical use of force

Watt’s concluding observations bring the conversation back to values. He upholds the First Amendment as a core principle, insisting that words—even offensive or inflammatory words—are not equivalent to violence. Protecting the free exchange of ideas requires not only security measures but also civic norms that tolerate disagreement and robust debate.

“I may despise what you say, but I will literally fight to the death to protect your right to say it.”

At the same time, Watt does not romanticize force. He insists violence must be a last resort and used ethically. Yet he acknowledges that there are moments in history—Pearl Harbor being his primary example—when violence is the only appropriate response to defend lives and national interests. He calls that idea “righteous violence”: the constrained, defensive use of force to prevent or stop greater evil. This is a moral argument as much as a tactical one: security measures are meant to protect the conditions for free speech, not to crush dissent.

Balancing values and safety

The final ethical challenge Watt highlights is balancing protective measures with civil liberties. The goal is not to create fortress campuses where speech is policed by default. Instead, Watt advocates for targeted, proportional risk mitigation that protects people and events while preserving openness and the free exchange of ideas. That balance requires transparency, community buy-in, and constant reassessment as threat environments evolve.

Conclusion: moving from reaction to resilient preparation

The Charlie Kirk incident served as a painful reminder that modern threats can exploit long-standing vulnerabilities—especially when event planning underestimates the range and sophistication of an adversary’s options. Randy Watt’s account is both a critique and a blueprint: a critique of presence-only security postures and fragmented planning; a blueprint for a layered, integrated approach that starts with honest risk analysis and ends with rehearsed, coordinated, and resourced protective measures.

Key takeaways that event organizers, campus administrators, and law enforcement leaders should carry forward include:

• Security is a layered system; personnel, physical, and technological measures must overlap.
• Threat assessment is a process, not a checkbox—early, sustained attention (starting at least three days out) improves outcomes.
• Close protection for principals is necessary but not sufficient; venue and perimeter management are equally critical.
• High-ground control and rooftop risk reduction remain classic tactical priorities in protecting events.
• Behavioral indicators and social media are vital parts of early-warning systems—take tips seriously and act quickly.
• Standardized templates and training supported by state-level public safety organizations can raise the baseline for smaller agencies.
• Finally, secure spaces for speech are an exercise in civic defense. Protecting the right to speak and assemble must be an active policy priority.

Watt’s combination of tactical expertise, strategic education, and public-service experience yields a coherent framework for preventing future tragedies and for guarding the public square. Implementing that framework will require investments of time, training, and trust—but the payoff is preserving the very liberties that make public debate possible.

Readers who want to explore this conversation further can view the original segment produced by PoliticIt for a full, uncut discussion of the issues and additional anecdotes from Watt’s time in uniform and in municipal command.

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